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An Analysis of Recent Data 
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Abstract 
The author takes a close look at bilateral German-Japanese trade and direct investment data, 
employing various techniques (intensity indicators, RCA, intra-industry trade). It turns out 
that German-Japanese trade and FDI links are indeed rather limited, as has frequently been 
stated. A number of somewhat surprising pieces of evidence do emerge, though. For 
competitive industries and with respect to emerging opportunities, the bilateral figures do 
show a healthy performance. 
Summary    
The author takes a close look at bilateral German-Japanese trade and direct investment data, 
employing various techniques, namely: 
•  single- and double-relative trade intensity measures, 
•  revealed comparative advantage (RCA) indices of various industries, 
•  bilateral intra-industry trade coefficients, 
•  single- and double-relative foreign direct investment (FDI) intensity measures. 
It turns out that German-Japanese trade and FDI links are indeed rather limited, as has 
frequently been stated. A number of somewhat surprising pieces of evidence do emerge, 
though: 
•  While trade intensity between Germany and Japan is low in both directions, it has not 
declined in recent years. 
•  Germany´s trade intensity with the US is lower than with Japan, and Japan´s trade 
intensity is declining vis-à-vis the US, not vis-à-vis Germany. 
•  German machinery exports to Japan show a high absolute volume, but reveal a 
comparative disadvantage – this does not hold for road vehicles, though, which also have 
a high RCA. 
•  German consumer goods have, contrary to frequently held beliefs, developed a revealed 
comparative advantage vis-à-vis Japan in recent years.  
•  While Germany and Japan show certain similar strengths in their bilateral trade (cars, 
other machinery, etc.), the level of intra-industry trade in the important categories has still 
not reached proportions of German trade within the EU or with the US; in that respect, 
links with Japan still have not quite matured. 
•  Germany profited from remarkably strong Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) 
associated with the latter´s move into the EU Common Market.  
•  More recently, FDI dynamism for both countries has shifted away from the bilateral link, 
which for FDI is now even less intense than for trade. 
The author concludes that while the bilateral links are indeed quite weak, the situation is not 
as bleak as may appear at first sight. Rather, for competitive industries and with respect to 
emerging opportunities, the bilateral figures do show a healthy performance. New challenges 
are currently rather sought elsewhere, though. It depends on the two economies overcoming 
their current weakness and regaining their dynamism, whether bilateral economic relations 
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Economic Relations Between Germany and Japan - 
An Analysis of Recent Data 
 








1. Introduction and overview 
 
It has become a well-worn argument that economic relations between the world´s second and 
third largest economies, namely Japan and Germany, are rather limited, particularly if 
compared with the links of both countries with the world´s no. 1 economy, the US. However, 
this view is usually only supported by rather general data. For instance, German exports to 
Japan in 2000 reached only about a fifth of the export level to the US, and from Japan´s point 
of view, exports to the US were more than seven times as large as those to Germany. 
 
In this paper we try to take a closer look at trade and direct investment data than earlier 
studies had done (e.g., Kreft 1994, Laumer 1998), employing various techniques to calculate 
meaningful coefficients: 
 
•  single- and double-relative trade intensity measures, 
•  revealed comparative advantage (RCA) indices of various industries, 
•  bilateral intra-industry trade coefficients, 
•  single- and double-relative foreign direct investment (FDI) intensity measures. 
 
This effort is worthwhile, because, while finding new empirical support for a number of 
conventional views held about bilateral relations between Germany and Japan, a number of 
somewhat surprising pieces of evidence do emerge: 
                                                 
* The author gratefully acknowledges support by his staff members, among them Gisela Philipsenburg and Ingo 
Meierhans in particular, in collecting the data, doing the calculations as well as processing data and text. 
The paper was prepared on the occasion of the 9
th Asia Pacific Conference of German Industry (APK), held in 
Tokyo, July 3 and July 4, 2002.   2
 
•  While trade intensity between Germany and Japan is low in both directions, it has not 
declined in recent years. 
•  Germany´s trade intensity with the US is lower than with Japan, and Japan´s trade 
intensity is declining vis-à-vis the US, not vis-à-vis Germany. 
•  German machinery exports to Japan show a high absolute volume, as is well known, 
but reveal a comparative disadvantage – this does not hold for road vehicles, though, 
which also have a high RCA. 
•  German consumer products (here defined as category 8 of the international trade 
classification) have, contrary to frequently held beliefs, developed a revealed 
comparative advantage vis-à-vis Japan in recent years.  
•  While Germany and Japan show certain similar strengths in their bilateral trade (cars, 
other machinery, etc.), the level of intra-industry trade in the important categories has 
still not reached proportions of German trade within the EU or with the US; in that 
respect, links with Japan still have not quite matured. 
•  Germany profited from remarkably strong Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) 
associated with the latter´s move into the EU Common Market.  
•  More recently, FDI dynamism for both countries has shifted away from the bilateral 
link, which for FDI is now even less intense than for trade. 
 
We conclude that while the links between the world´s second- and third-ranking economies 
are indeed quite weak, the situation is not as bleak as may appear at first sight. Rather, for 
competitive industries and with respect to emerging opportunities, the bilateral figures do 
show a healthy performance. Still, new challenges are currently rather sought elsewhere. It 
depends on the two economies overcoming their current weakness and regaining their 
dynamism, whether bilateral economic relations will (again) become more dynamic as well. 
 
 
2. Current trade relations 
 
Before entering this analysis, we present a basic overview of current bilateral trade relations, 
putting Germany in an EU framework. Figures 1 and 2 give an overview over bilateral trade 
in recent years. As for Germany´s position within the EU (Allen 2002), the country is the 
EU´s main trading partner with Japan; its export share was 29 percent and its import share is   3
27 percent of all European trade with Japan in 2000. The second ranking member country in 
terms of exports to Japan is France with some 12 percent, and the Netherlands in terms of 
imports with about 13 percent. The difference to Germany´s figures is significant.  
 
 
Figure 1: German exports to Japan, in 1000 Mio. DM  
Source: German Statistical Office  
 
 
Figure 2: German imports from Japan, in 1000 Mio. DM 
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Looking at recent changes and concentrating on the period since 1995, though, Germany´s 
preeminence has been slowly declining. Between 1995 and 2000, Germany lost some one or 
two percentage points in terms of share (tables 1 and 2), while the most dynamic member 
country in this context has been Ireland, which raised its export share from 3 to 7 percent, due 
to its successful move into modern industries and based on favourable cost and tax conditions 
as well as – some would add - subsidies. As for imports, the Netherlands became a dynamic 
trading partner of Japan, raising its share from 10 to 13 percent. While its economy is rather 
small, its growing role as an import gate to the Common Market and intermediate imports for 
Japanese direct investment in the country may have been important reasons. 
 
 
Table 1: Exports of EU member states to Japan (in %) 
 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Belg.-Lux.  5.0 5.4 5.1 4.9 5.7  5.3
Denmark  4.2 3.7 3.9 3.8 4.3  4.3
Germany  30.6 31.0 28.9 29.5 29.3  29.4
Greece  0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2  0.2
Spain  2.8 2.5 2.7 2.9 3.0  2.7
France  13.2 12 12.1 13.4 12.2  12.2
Ireland  3.0 3.0 4.0 4.6 5.4  7.1
Italy  12.4 12.2 11.5 11.4 9.9  9.7
Netherlands  4.8 4.8 4.9 5.3 5.8  5.3
Austria  1.8 2.0 1.8 1.7 2.1  2.1
Portugal  0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3  0.3
Finland  2.4 2.3 1.9 1.8 1.9  1.9
Sweden  5.5 6.0 5.9 5.0 5.4  5.9
UK  13.7 14.5 16.8 15.2 14.4  13.5
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Table 2: Imports of EU member states from Japan (in %) 
 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Belg.-Lux.  6.6 6.3 5.9 6.0 6.9  6.1
Denmark  1.5 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.1  0.8
Germany  29.4 29.5 27.6 27.2 26.4  27.4
Greece  1.0 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.7  1.1
Spain  4.0 3.8 3.9 4.4 4.8  4.5
France  9.5 8.9 8.9 8.6 9.2  9.9
Ireland  2.2 2.3 3.3 3.2 2.9  2.6
Italy  6.3 6.0 6.2 6.4 7.2  7.5
Netherlands  10.3 12.0 12.1 12.9 12.8  13.1
Austria  1.6 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.4  1.4
Portugal  1.0 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.4  1.2
Finland  2.1 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9  1.6
Sweden  3.2 2.9 3.1 2.6 3.0  3.2
UK  21.4 21.0 22.0 21.4 19.2  19.7
 
Source: Allen 2002, p. 2 
 
 
The trade balance is an economic indicator well watched for political resons
1. As for EU 
trade with Japan (table 3), the European deficit has considerably increased in recent years, 
from 21 billion ECU in 1995 to 41 billion euro in 2000. Germany and the UK have the largest 
trade deficits with Japan, and they, too, have increased in recent years. Together, both 
countries still account for about half of the total EU deficit with Japan. However, the most 
dynamic increase can be noticed elsewhere. The bilateral deficit of the Netherlands with 
Japan has become almost as large as that of Germany and the UK; France´s deficit with Japan, 













                                                 
1 While we know from economic theory that a bilateral surplus or deficit is difficult to interpret and certainly 
does not simply indicate the strength or weakness of an economy vis-à-vis another, politicians still watch it 
carefully, and it is therefore an important source of information on potential policy problems.   6
Table 3: Bilateral balance of trade Japan-EU (in Mio. ECU/EUR) 
 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
EU-15  -21,403 -16,787 -23,779 -34,475 -36,537 -41,121
Belg.-Lux.  -1,909 -1,384 -1 683 -2,395 -2,939 -2,867
Denmark  592 616 652 445 725 -1,219
Germany  -5,920 -4,428 -6,076 -8,667 -8,646 -10,348
Greece  -455 -652 -750 -817 -1,160 -833
Spain  -1,270 -1,120 -1,347 -2,006 -2,397 -2,628
France  -843 -407 -957 -1,480 -2,293 -3,003
Ireland  -184 -108 -542 -674 -192 985
Italy  640 1,245 439 -624 -1,649 -2,083
Netherlands  -4,005 -4,566 -5,499 -6,873 -7,172 -8,855
Austria  -274 -108 -137 -354 -229 -246
Portugal  -425 -458 -607 -825 -912 -941
Finland  -335 -164 -454 -677 -675 -525
Sweden  87 598 300 -160 -237 -98
UK  -7,100 -5,853 -7,118 -9,367 -8,758 -10,848
 
Source: Allen 2002, p. 3 
 
 
As for explaining the growing deficit with Japan, imports from Japan have shown a 
continuous increase since 1995, while exports to Japan have risen only slightly. One factor 
has been Japan´s economic stagnation or at least sub-average growth rates in recent years, 
which has made it difficult to export more goods to Japan. Even in relative terms, though, the 
EU´s share of Japan´s imports declined from 14.5 percent in 1995 to 12.4 percent in 2000. 
Germany lost about 0.8 percentage point of Japan´s imports, thus accounting for almost half 
of the EU´s loss. In terms of European imports, there is some statistical evidence for a 
redirection of exports from crisis-stricken East Asia to Europe during 1998 and 1999, but 
following the recovery of the region and of Japan´s imports into it, the EU has almost returned 
to its former market share. 
 
A policy issue may emerge in case a weakening Japanese Yen will lead to even more exports 
into the EU, while a continuing weakness of the economy might still put a lid on Japan´s 
imports, worsened by European products becoming more expensive due to the devaluation of 
the Yen. This would increase the EU´s trade deficit with Japan further, and given recent 
tendencies of Germany´s changing shares within the EU, Germany would be one of the 
principal economies affected. However, this has not become a policy issue yet and given the   7
small share of Japan´s goods among Germany´s imports, it is doubtful whether this would cast 
a shadow over bilateral relations. 
 
 
3. Trade intensity 
 
How are the bilateral trade flows between Japan and Germany to be interpreted in the context 
of both economies? For a preliminary answer, we calculated so-called single-relative trade 
intensities, i. e. related imports and exports to the overall import level and level of both 
countries. For any given year, we thus receive four percentage figures. Results for 1991 and 
2000 are reported in table 4. All values are in the low single digit percentage figures, a rather 
disappointing performance for two of the world´s major economies. Even more striking, in all 
four cases trade intensity has declined over the last decade. However, we should not jump to 
any conclusions. One reason why it is difficult to interpret changes in (bilateral) trade is that 
such changes may be due to overall shifts in the trade patterns and not to specific issues in the 
bilateral context.  
 
 
Table 4: Single-relative trade intensity between Japan and Germany (in %) 
 
    1991 2000
Exports  Japan´s share among German exports  2.4 2.2
  Germany´s share among Japanese exports  6.6 4.2
Imports  Japan´s share among German imports  6.1 4.9
  Germany´s share among Japanese imports  4.5 3.4
 
Source:   Own calculations, based on OECD foreign trade data 
 
 
For more insights, we will follow the Savage-Deutsch approach (Savage/Deutsch 1960, 
Sautter 1983), by which a double-relative index of trade intensity can be measured. It 
compares the actual trade level from country X to Y with X´s overall inclination to export and 




2, we have operationalised the approach as follows: First, a 
probability for X (e. g., Germany) to export to Y (e. g., Japan) is calculated by multiplying 
                                                 
2 OECD trade data were used instead of data on world trade, e. g. supplied by UNCTAD, because we could find 
more recent data from OECD. For consistency reasons, we have used export data throughout (see also the next   8
Germany´s share in overall exports within OECD with Japan´s share in overall imports within 
OECD
3. This probability is multiplied with the overall level of trade within OECD, 
operationalised by the total export amount of OECD economies among themselves. 




The actual export level from X to Y is divided by this estimate and can be interpreted as an 





If its value is larger than one, actual trade is larger than the estimate, i.e. more trade takes 
place than would be expected from the trade patterns of the two economies concerned and 
given a certain situation of world (or OECD) trade. If the value is smaller than one, there is 
less trade than might be expected. 
 
Data for German exports throughout the 1990s is presented in table 5. As expected, the 
double-relative trade intensity from Germany to Japan is well below one, i. e. the actual 
values are more than a third lower than should be expected from German and Japanese trade 
patterns. It may be somewhat encouraging, though, that despite the progress of European 
integration and Japan´s strong links within the Asian region, at least trade intensity from 
Germany to Japan did not decline during the 1990s.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
footnote). We have done some calculations using import data only and have found no significant difference with 
respect to the results of export-based calculations. Calculating the probablility is based on the assumption that 
X´s propensity to export is independent of Y´s propensity to import. Moreover, in principal there should be a 
correction of the estimated probabilities due to the fact that no country can trade with itself; however, given the 
rather large number of participating economies and because we are interested in changes over time, not so much 
in the estimated levels itself, we did without such minor corrections. 
3 In order to keep the data consistent, we used export data for calculating the imports into Japan, i. e. exports 
from all OECD economies to Japan were divided by the sum of all OECD exports to other OECD economies. 
economies   OECD   among   exports   All
     to OECD   from   Exports   *   OECD    to   from   Exports  
       to   from   level export  for    Estimate
Y X
Y X =
     to   from   level export  for    Estimate  
   to   from   exports   Actual
       to   from intensity     trade relative - Double
Y X
Y X
Y X =  9
Table 5: Double-relative trade intensity of German exports with major trading partners 
 
Partner  1991 1994 1997 2000
Japan  0.59 0.59 0.57 0.59
USA  0.49 0.49 0.53 0.52
UK  1.14 1.23 1.26 1.27
Netherlands  1.67 1.72 1.55 1.49
France  1.65 1.74 1.64 1.79
 
Source: Own calculations, based on OECD foreign trade data 
For an explanation of double-relative trade intensity, see text 
 
 
It should be helpful to evaluate Japan´s position among Germany´s export partners in relation 
to other major developed economies. Such data is also provided in the table. As expected, 
Germany´s export intensity with leading EU economies is high and is indeed still rising 
further. However, with respect to the US, exports to Japan do not compare badly. Actually, 
the intensity values for exports to the US are lower than for Japan, although the gap is 
narrowing slowly. Exports to the US are large in absolute terms due to the vast size of the US 
economy and its import levels (as well as its trade deficit), while an intensity measure shows 
that in relative terms German exports to the US are not so impressive, for instance, when 
compared to exports to the world´s second largest economy, Japan. 
 
As is the case with Germany´s exports to Japan, Japanese exports to Germany also have an 
intensity level of less than one (table 6). Apart from the strong 1991 figure (to some extent 
due to strong auto sales in the post-unification phase), values are around 0.6 with some 
evidence for a slow increase.  
 
 
Table 6: Double-relative trade intensity of Japanese exports with major trading 
partners 
 
Partner  1991 1994 1997 2000
Germany  0.72 0.59 0.62 0.64
USA  2.99 2.66 2.54 2.20
UK  0.69 0.70 0.71 0.68
Netherlands  0.61 0.68 0.77 0.91
France  0.32 0.27 0.31 0.35
 
 
Source: Own calculations, based on OECD foreign trade data   10
Comparing the bilateral Japanese-German export intensity with Japan´s exports to other major 
economies, Japan´s strong reliance on the US market is evident. Still, it should be noted that 
this dependence notably decreased from 3.0 to 2.2 during the 1991-2000 period, whereas 
there is no such deterioration with respect to trade with the world´s third largest economy, 
Germany. Looking at trade data for other major European economies, Germany holds a 
respectable middle place, similar to the UK and much larger than France. For all EU countries 
considered, the value is below one. The Netherlands occupies a very strong position, having 
moved beyond 0.9 in 2000, but it is not clear to what extent this is due to Japanese exports 
just passing through Dutch ports and going on to other final destinations. 
 
 
4. Bilateral trade by industrial sector 
 
It is frequently argued that German-Japanese trade relations show a peculiar pattern of 
industrial sectors involved, pointing towards certain problems. For instance, it is often said 
that German final consumer goods, such as leather products, apparel, processed foods and 
beverages, for example, are not to be found in the Japanese market; this is often combined 
with the advice to German firms in this sector to try harder. 
 
In table 7, some raw data on principal German exports to Japan is presented. The strongest 
export items are machinery, road vehicles (mainly cars) and pharmaceutical/cosmetic 
products. Indeed, consumption goods (defined here as goods belonging to SITC category 8
4) 
only amounted to 11 percent of German exports to Japan in 2000, hardly up from 10 percent 













                                                 
4 SITC category 8 is formally labelled „miscellaneous manufactured products“ and includes sanitary, furniture, 
travel goods, handbags, apparel, footwear, photographic apparatus, and watches, among others. Thus, it can be 
regarded as an acceptable proxy for (miscellaneous) consumer goods.    11
Table 7: German exports to Japan; major industries 
 
(in 1000 US Dollars) 
 
Industries  1991 1994  1997 2000 
Food, Beverages, Oils  201,140 312,169  299,175 251,421 
Crude materials, Fuels  62,140 102,458  95,858 81,178 
Chemicals  1,065,582 1,255,963  1,269,115 1,589,548 
Pharmaceutical, Cosmetic 
products   779,320 1,021,992  782,243 810,333 
Manufactured goods  703,357 613,190  751,074 840,906 
Machinery  2,240,838 2,123,565  2,718,246 2,971,355 
Road vehicles  3,600,263 4,133,277  4,129,875 3,986,542 
Misc. consumer  goods  953,647 1,144,190  1,337,507 1,313,510 
Total  9,629,672 10,724,056  11,386,682 11,850,122 
 
Source: Own calculations, based on OECD foreign trade data 
Figures do not add up to total, because SITC 9 was omitted. 
 
 
Explanation of industries: 
 
“Food, Beverages, Oils”:  SITC 0  (“Food and live animals”) + SITC 1 (“Beverages and Tobacco”) + SITC 4 
(“Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes”) 
“Crude materials, Fuels”:  SITC 2 (“Crude materials, inedible, except fuels”) + SITC 3 (“Mineral fuels, 
lubricants and related materials”) 
“Chemicals”:   SITC 5 (“Chemicals and related products”) - [SITC 54 (“Medical and pharmaceutical 
products”) + SITC55 (“Essential oils and resinoids and perfume material, toilet and 
cleaning preparations) ”) ] 
“Pharmaceutical, Cosmetic products”: SITC 54 (“Medical and pharmaceutical products”) + SITC55 (“Essential 
oils and resinoids and perfume material, toilet and cleaning preparations) ”) 
“Manufactured goods”:  SITC 6 (“Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material”) 
“Machinery“:   SITC 7 (“Machinery and transport equipment - SITC 78 (“Road vehicles (including 
air-cushion vehicles) ”) 
“Road vehicles”:    SITC 78 (“Road vehicles (including air-cushion vehicles) ”) 
“Misc. consumer goods”:  SITC 8 (“Miscellaneous manufactured articles”). See footnote 4.  
SITC according to Standard Industrial Trade Classification, Revision 3 
 
 
Such simple empirical evidence is hardly satisfactory, though, because it tells little about 
whether an emerging pattern is peculiar to trade with Japan or a general aspect of German 
external economic relations. To learn more, the concept of the revealed comparative 
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where i (exporter) and j (importer) are countries and s is an (industrial) sector. 
 
The bilateral RCA compares to what extent an exporting country`s specialisation in its overall 
trade of industry s goods is similar in its trade with a particular importing country j. For 
instance, if machinery makes up 20 percent of i´s trade with j (the numerator in the formula 
above), but only 10 percent in its overall trade (the denominator), then good s enjoys a certain 
comparative advantage in i´s exports to j.The bilateral RCA´s value in this case is  2 (namely 
20 %/10 %) and emphasizes this very fact. Obviously, the critical level of the indicator is 1. If 
the sectoral RCA is higher, it denotes a specialization, if it is lower, it reveals a comparative 
disadvantage.  
 
The concept has some particular strengths. For instance, it is consistent with Ricardo´s finding 
that there is no absolute trade advantage or disadvantage, but only a relative one in 
comparison with other goods or sectors. Moreover, an RCA is independent of size and overall 
trade surplus/deficit situations. However, there is also a price to be paid: the RCA only covers 
actual performance and does not contain information on the reasons behind the realised 
exports; strictly speaking, it does not denote “true” competitiveness, because a high RCA may 
be due to subsidies, for instance. 
 
With these considerations in mind, table 8 contains RCA values for German exports to Japan. 
Surprisingly, the bilateral RCA for consumption goods was only slightly below unity in the 
early 1990s and has since risen above 1. The presumed weakness of the consumption goods 
sector is not a peculiar feature of German trade with Japan according to this calculation, but is 
a problem of German trade in general. True enough, if one compares the limited presence of 
major German brands in Japan, such as Montblanc fountain pens or Goldpfeil leather products 
with the prevalence of the likes of Louis Vuitton, Burberry or Gucci, the impression one may 
be getting is that this signifies a peculiar business weakness. However, such a view cannot be 
supported when taking the overall German trade pattern into account. It is thus doubtful 
whether this aspect should really be a major issue for bilateral business or policy fora. At 






   13
Table 8: Revealed comparative advantage (RCA) for German exports to Japan 
 
Industries  1991 1994 1997 2000
Food, Beverages, Oils  0.40 0.55 0.54 0.60
Crude materials, Fuels  0.40 0.55 0.54 0.60
Chemicals  1.07 1.11 1.09 1.42
Pharmaceutical, Cosmetic 
products  0.84 0.93 0.92 1.20
Manufactured goods  0.43 0.35 0.43 0.51
Machinery  0.69 0.60 0.71 0.74
Road vehicles  2.43 2.39 2.16 1.94
Misc. consumer  goods  0.89 1.02 1.19 1.18
 
Source: Own calculations, based on OECD foreign trade data 
For industries, see table 7; for RCA, see text 
 
 
Interestingly, other sectors are also full of surprises. While machinery products (ex transport 
vehicles), a renowned industrial branch run by German Mittelstand (small and medium) 
entrepreneurs, belong indeed to one of the biggest export sectors in bilateral trade with Japan, 
contributing a volume of some two billion dollars in 2000, its bilateral RCA was consistently 
below unity during the 1990s. This could be interpreted as evidence for the often proclaimed 
structural weakness of German small and medium enterprises to reach out to distant markets. 
 
Looking for the highest bilateral RCAs, road vehicles, i. e. mainly passenger cars, occupy as 
expected – top rank. German companies were not able to improve their relative position 
throughout the 90s though, but showed a decline from 2.4 in 1991 to 1.9 in 2000, still well 
above 1, though. As for significant positive developments, chemical products and 
pharmaceutical/cosmetic products in particular could improve their standing beyond the unity 
level. On the negative side, raw materials as well as intermediate products made of various 
materials as well as the agricultural sector, including food and beverages are particularly 
weak, which comes as no surprise. 
 
A similar analysis can be undertaken for Japan´s exports to Germany. Using the same 
classification of industrial sectors as before, table 9 shows that machinery products (ex road 
vehicles) clearly dominate trade flows. Road vehicles, which means mainly passenger cars, 
and consumer goods of SITC category 8 are other strong export sectors.  
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Table 9: Japanese exports to Germany; major industries 
 
(in 1000 US Dollars) 
 
Industries  1991 1994 1997 2000
Food, Beverages, Oils  32,566 29,193 14,788 16,174
Crude materials, Fuels  78,600 74,980 68,209 97,844
Chemicals  741,603 763,167 804,196 762,619
Pharmaceutical, Cosmetic 
products  113,143 162,032 200,063 135,810
Manufactured goods  988,851 866,586 870,181 1,021,906
Machinery  10,340,561 9,522,559 9,724,651 11,665,703
Road vehicles  5,504,953 4,136,487 3,871,955 2,865,295
Misc. consumer  goods  2,657,340 2,108,997 2,114,522 2,455,476
Japanese Exports to 
Germany  20,619,945 17,908,830 17,998,663 19,994,733
 
Source: Own calculations, based on OECD foreign trade data 
For industries, see table 7; figures do not add up due to omissions 
 
Turning to the performance of these sectors in relation to Japan´s overall trade patterns, i. e. 
employing RCA analysis (table 10), it turns out that in its strongest sectors with respect to 
trade with Germany, namely SITC categories 7 (machinary)  and 8 (misc. Consumer goods), 
these exports rather closely resemble Japan´s overall export pattern, i. e. being rather close to 
unity. Despite the strength of Japan´s automobile industry, its bilateral RCA with Germany 
declined from 1.2 to 0.8 between 1991 and 2000; however, this can be explained by the many 
Japanese cars now entering Germany from production facilities within the EU. Other 
machinery products as well as category 8 consumption goods reveal relative strength, but do 
not seem to overly target the German market; there is only a small RCA increase for 
machinery items and an actual slight decline for consumer goods. Although 
pharmaceuticals/cosmetics showed some strength before, the 2000 figures are below unity. As 
expected, the more upstream sectors are weak, while there is some positive development for 
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Table 10: Revealed comparative advantage (RCA) for Japanese exports to Germany  
 
 
Industries  1991 1994 1997 2000
Food, Beverages, Oils  0.27 0.31 0.15 0.18
Crude materials, Fuels  0.36 0.34 0.32 0.49
Chemicals  0.72 0.79 0.70 0.59
Pharmaceutical, Cosmetic 
products  1.00 1.50 1.61 0.83
Manufactured goods  0.41 0.45 0.44 0.52
Machinery  1.03 1.03 1.07 1.16
Road vehicles  1.19 1.14 1.14 0.78
Misc. consumer  goods  1.51 1.53 1.40 1.36
 
Source: Own Calculations, based on OECD foreign trade data 
For industries, see table 7; for RCA, see text 
 
 
Summing up the findings from RCA analysis, among German exports the relative strength of 
road vehicles stands out, while despite their impressive absolute volume other machinery 
products are somewhat weak. Consumer goods (here defined as SITC category 8) are stronger 
than is frequently presumed. This last finding holds even more if pharmaceutical/cosmetic 
products and road vehicles, mainly passenger cars, are also understood as consumer items. As 
for Japan, there is little evidence of a particular “targeting” policy with respect to Germany. 
Road vehicle exports even show an RCA weakness, because such exports have been 
substituted by deliveries from other, mainly European, production bases. 
 
 
5. Intra-industry trade 
 
Another way to look at sectoral patterns of trade is to study the presence of intra-industry 
trade. Since Grubel´s and Lloyd´s pathbreaking study (1975), intra-industry trade is 
understood as an important indicator of economic integration between economies. Changes 
and sectoral differences can point to business problems and potential trade friction. 
 
A superficial glimpse at trade data suggests that Germany and Japan have similar strengths in 
their bilateral trade, with motor cars and other machinery products ranking high in each 
other´s shopping list. However, based on such crude data it is difficult to compare bilateral 
trade to overall trade patterns and to characterise its development.   16
 
For a more careful analysis, the so-called Grubel-Lloyd index of intra-industry trade in sector 




where Xs and Ms denote exports and imports of the respective sector or good. The index 
shows the extent of exports and imports having a similar or different level, controlling the size 
of trade, namely exports plus imports. If exports and imports are the same, i. e. in case of a 
maximum intra-industry trade interaction, the numerator will be zero and the index 100. In 
case there is no intra-industry integration at all, i. e. either exports or imports are zero, the 
fraction will be one and therefore the index zero. For all interpretations it should be noted that 
the Grubel-Lloyd index is sensitive in two respects. First, its values depend on the distinction 
being made as regards the number of sectors. The higher the number of sectors, the less intra-
industry trade will show up; moreover, if one compares a country´s intra-industry trade with 
that of another country and that of a world region, the index for the latter will often tend to be 
bigger. A second point is that index values are affected by the presence of (bilateral) trade 
surpluses or deficits; in a surplus country, for instance, index values for at least some 
industries must be quite low, because there are just not enough imports to more or less 
balance exports in all sectors. 
 
Figure 3 presents data for German-Japanese intra-industry trade (IIT), based on the sectoral 
distinction used in RCA analysis. Some IIT index values are quite high, for instance in 
agricultural and in intermediate products as well as in road vehicles. More interestingly, IIT 
values for a couple of leading sectors in bilateral trade are quite low: this holds for machinery 
products as well as for pharmaceutical/cosmetic products. In the first case, while machinery is 
also a strong German export item, it is overwhelmed by imports from Japan, particularly in 
electrical products. In the latter, Japanese industry has little to compensate German successes 
in pharmaceutical products. IIT in consumption goods (SITC 8) is also quite low, as Japan´s 

















Figure 3: Intra-industry trade between Japan and Germany 
 
Source: Based on OECD foreign trade data; own calculations 
For industries, see table 7 
 
During the 1990s, there was no consistent trend of closer economic integration between the 
two countries; in the latter 1990s, there is even some decline. Some IIT values have indeed 
increased. Arguably, road vehicles is the most important one among those. However, this is 
not due to an increased bilateral interaction, but to a substitution effect of Japanese cars now 
being exported from Europe; because of this, Japanese exports have decreased to a level 
similar to German exports to Japan. For chemicals, there is actually a decline, for machinery 
(ex road vehicles) more or less stagnation. 
 
How does this compare with the overall German trade pattern? Taking Germany´s trade with 
its major partners EU15 and US (figure 4) as well as the world in general as a point of 
departure, it is clear that economic interdependence with Japan as measured with IIT is lower 
in most sectors, at least the important ones. One important exception is road vehicles, where 
Germany is a notable net exporter with almost all major countries, whereas the high IIT index 
in its trade with Japan is somewhat distorted. The most important finding is, though, that there 
is no clear tendency for IIT between Germany and Japan having reached similar levels to 
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Taking Japanese patterns as a point of departure, Japan´s trade with the US (figure 5) or with 
EU15 is more intra-industry intensive than with Germany in the major industries, the 
principle exception, again, being road vehicles. 
 
Summing up, the intra-industry trade between Japan and Germany is not as high as is usually 
perceived when comparing the major bilateral export activites. There is still room for further 
increase, when comparisons with other major trading partners are taken as benchmarks. 
However, it should be stressed that these findings should be supported by an IIT analysis 
based on a more differentiated analysis of industrial branches. 
 
 
Figure 4: Intra-industry trade between the US and Germany 
Source: Based on OECD foreign trade data; own calculations 






















Figure 5: Intra-industry-trade between the US and Japan 
 
 
Source: Based on OECD foreign trade data; own calculations 




6. Direct investment relations  
 
An analysis of bilateral business relations should not solely focus on trade, but should take 
into account foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI as compared to so-called portfolio 
investment is understood to be an expression of a lasting interest in a foreign enterprise. 
According to the recommendations by the OECD, an ownership share of 10 percent or more 
is evidence of such an interest. As can easily be appreciated from these facts, the way in 
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information. Owing to data limitations, we feel unable to perform a meaningful analysis with 
industry-level figures at this stage. 
 
Figure 6 gives a basic overview of German-Japanese FDI relations in recent years based on 
stock data. As for German investment in Japan, there has been a notable increase in the late 
1990s, following various Japanese deregulation and market opening measures (for more 
detailed information, see DIHKJ 1999, Bromann et al. 2000). As for Japan, it already owned a 
considerable stock of FDI in Germany around 1990. During the 1990s, there was hardly any 
further increase; rather, a couple of consolidation measures among existing investments took 
place (more details in GfW 2000). 
 
 
Figure 6: Foreign direct investment (FDI) between Germany and Japan 
 
(in 1000 Mill. EUR, End-of-Year Levels)  
 
 




To continue the analysis, we present some data putting Japanese-German FDI relations in the 































Table 11: Japanese FDI outflow and inflow in 2000 (1 April 2000 – 31 March 2001) 
 
Values in mio. US Dollars (based on 1 US dollar = 110.52 yen), shares in percent 
 
  Outflow   Outflow share  Inflow  Inflow share 
USA  12,136  25.0  9,141  32.3 
Latin America ex 
Cayman Islands 
2,496  5.1  327  1.2 
4 Asian NIEs  2,682  5.5  372  1.3 
ASEAN4  2,035  4.2  1  0.0 
China  995  2.0  5  0.0 
EU  23,909  49.2  4,267  15.1 
(France)  (325)  (0.7)  (n.a.)  (0.9) 
(Germany)  (320)  (0.7)  (2,530)  (8.9) 
(Netherlands)  (2,757)  (5.7)  (468)  (1.7) 
(U.K.)  (19,142)  (39.4)  (506)  (1.8) 
Other Europe (ex 
EU) 
497  1.0  1,967  7.0 
Oceania  667  1.4  62  0.2 
Foreign firms 
already in Japan 
--  --  10,326  36.5 
TOTAL  48,580  100.0  28,276  100.0 
Source:   JETRO 2002, pp. 18 and 24, some recalculations by the author 
Notes:   Based on Ministry of Finance (Japan) notification data. 
Shares do not add up to 100 percent, because some areas are not reported here. 
 
As for outflowing Japanese investment, the EU´s position was very strong in 2000; almost 
half of Japan´s FDI was headed there. The U. K. and the Netherlands were the most important 
destinations, with Germany collecting less than 1 percent of FDI outflow. While this seems an 
encouraging number, at least from a European, if not necessarily from a German point of 
view, the figures have to be interpreted extremely carefully. The main reason is that they also 
include investment into merger and acquisition (M&A) activities, which have risen 
significantly in recent years. According to KPMG´s dealwatch database, OECD economies 
moved around more than 700 billion US dollars in 1999, with Japan contributing about 20 
billion and receiving about 16 billion US dollars (Miyake/Sass 2000, p. 31). A few major 
deals can thus significantly influence the level of bilateral FDI flows in any one year. As for 
the 2000 data, prepared on the basis of the Japanese Ministry of Finance notification files, 
outflow to Britain is overstated, because some major investment by NTT DoCoMo was 
ultimately targeted at the US (JETRO 2002, p. 16).  
 
Also, the number for the Netherlands cannot be taken at face value. A significant proportion 
seems to have gone into setting up holding companies for European operations as a result of   22
attractive taxation schemes offered by the Dutch government. This is a frequently heard 
suggestion and can be supported empirically by comparing the bilateral Japanese FDI outflow 
data with the Dutch FDI inflow data, which excludes intermediate holding companies (Special 
Financial Institutions) (OECD 2000, p. 453). There has been a huge discrepancy between both 
time series in recent years. For instance, according to Japanese sources, in 1998 Japan 
invested some 2 billion US dollars in the Netherlands, while the amount stated in Dutch data 
was 431 million US dollars. For 1999 the difference was even larger, but in that case it was 
distorted by Japanese M&A in the telecom market. Despite these factors, it cannot, however, 
be ruled out that the Netherlands has indeed become a more attractive FDI location for 
Japanese companies than Germany. In order to diminish the influence of major M&A deals 
and holding companies somewhat, we have compared the number of FDI cases as well, 
irrespective of their volume
5. To achieve comparability, we have used Japanese data. In 2000, 
the leading destinations within the EU were as follows:  Netherlands 305, U.K. 281, 
Luxembourg 43, Germany 29, France 13. Disregarding the special case of Luxembourg 
(banking), the Dutch and the British economies clearly stand out as major destinations, with 
Germany reaching only a tenth of their number of cases. 
 
As for other parts of Europe, Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have recently become notable 
destinations. This is in line with a frequently heard suggestion that Japanese subsidiaries in 
Germany had been important in servicing CEE markets for many years, while more recently 
there has been a shift towards setting up subsidiaries there directly. 
 
We now turn to Japanese inflows. FDI headed for Japan as one of the most advanced 
countries is still dominated by companies from other advanced OECD economies (table 12). 
Even neighbouring Pacific Asian nations have hardly made any significant inroads. The EU 
occupies a strong no. 2 spot behind the USA, with the “Other Europe” category almost 
entirely filled by Switzerland. Again, one has to be careful in not overinterpreting the data 
which contain major M&A deals. In the first half of fiscal year 2001, for instance, the EU 
accounted for some 58 percent of Japanese FDI inflows and the US “only” for some 29 
percent. Germany is certainly one of the stronger investors in Japan, while the 2000 data 
reported above are somewhat out of proportion because of the voluminous DaimlerChrysler-
Mitsubishi deal. 
                                                 
5 It is assumed that a few major deals do not affect those figures significantly. Also, as the number of 
conglomerates and company networks is rather limited, the number of holding company cases involved in the 
whole number of cases should be rather small, not amounting to several hundred cases.    23
7. Relative intensity of bilateral FDI 
 
As with respect to the trade figures, we now construct single-relative measures of FDI 
intensity, i. e. looking at the actual FDI flows in relation to the overall FDI outflows or 
inflows, and with respect to the investing or receiving country. To account for the wide 
fluctuation of annual FDI flows, we used averages for the 1990-92 period and compared them 
to 1997-99
6. According to the results presented in Table 12, the shares both countries occupy 
in each other´s FDI activities – the single-relative intensities - are in general even lower than 
in their trade profiles (table 4 above). Also, as with respect to trade, they have further declined 
in recent years, to levels between 0.5 and 3 percent. The only notably high figure is Japan´s 
share of 22 percent in Germany´s incoming FDI of 1990-92, which is primarily due to Japan 
preparing for the European Common Market. 
 
 
Table 12: Single-relative FDI intensity between Japan and Germany (in %) 
 
    1990-92 1997-99
Outflows  Japan´s share among German FDI outflows  1.4 0.5
  Germany´s share among Japanese FDI outflows  2.4 1.2
Inflows  Japan´s share among German FDI inflows  22.5 1.5
  Germany´s share among Japanese FDI inflows  5.0 3.0
 
Source: Own Calculations, based on OECD FDI data 
 
 
For a more thorough analysis, we compare actual FDI flows between Japan and Germany to 
the overall inclination of both economies to engage in FDI activities, taking the global trend 
of FDI into account. This so-called double-relative measure is constructed in a similar way as 




The actual FDI level from X to Y  is divided by this estimate and can be interpreted as an 
indicator of FDI-intensity among the two economies involved: 
 
                                                 
6 Unfortunately, more up-to-date data was not available on a consistent basis. 
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The actual calculation is complicated by the fact that FDI data are much more difficult to 
handle than trade figures. We already noted the problem of defining and counting FDI, which 
is particularly tricky when data from different sources is involved. Also, flows can change 
significantly from year to year as mentioned before. To account for the latter problem, we 
again calculated averages for the 1990 to 1992 period and compared them to the 1997 to 1999 
average, thus eliminating single-year peaks and troughs. As for the first problem, we did the 
estimations with the “actual FDI flow from X to Y” not only with outflow data from X, but 
also with inflow data from Y, looking for problematic differences. While the continuous 
efforts of OECD have enabled us to do this calculation at all, it should be stressed that the 
data basis is still somewhat problematic and that results should not be overinterpreted. Rather, 
they can help to develop meaningful ideas and hypotheses for further research. 
 
Results are presented in table 13 - and they look quite dramatic. While in the early 1990s the 
intensity of investment relations between Germany and Japan was quite strong, it has 
significantly weakened in recent years. In 1990-92, Japan took a keen interest in the European 
Common Market project and Germany was a principal location chosen to circumvent possible 
barriers. This is reflected in the fact that the actual FDI flow from Japan to Germany was 
about 50 percent higher than was to be expected from the overall structural factors.  
 
Table 13: Double-relative FDI intensity between Germany and Japan 
 
  1990-92 1997-99
Japan´s FDI outflow to Germany  1.51 0.32
Germany´s FDI outflow to Japan  0.74 0.31
 
Source:   Own Calculations; based on OECD FDI data for bilateral FDI flows and 
UNCTAD data for global FDI flows 
 
 
At the end of the decade, both intensity measures declined well below the unity level. Several 
reasons can be put forward for the significant decline. First, we should repeat that values 
fluctuate widely between years. For instance, due to the Daimler-Mitsubishi deal German 
investment in Japan in 2000 was much bigger than in 1999. Would the two values have been 
     to   from   flow   FDI for    Estimate  
   to   from   flow   FDI   Actual
     to   from intensity    FDI   relative - Double
Y X
Y X
Y X =  25
the other way round, the double-intensity index for German FDI in Japan would have been 
around 0.8 instead of 0.3 – still below unity, though. There are more structural reasons for the 
decline of intensity as well. One factor frequently mentioned is that both countries are “early 
starters” in each other´s investment market and are now concentrating on other pastures. For 
Japan, for instance, Germany was an early outpost in Europe when its companies could not 
afford to be present everywhere, but now that Japan has become richer and other markets 
have started to catch up, Japan is engaged in secondary investments all over Europe in a kind 
of “cascade approach”. However, this view is but a euphemism for the observation that 
dynamism in international economic relations has shifted away from the German-Japanese 
link to other promising options still untapped. Public and business attention is not 
concentrated on what has been achieved in the past, but on the new challenges lying 
elsewhere. 
 
Another factor is that both economies are considered to possess insider-oriented corporate 
governance schemes. This implies that it is difficult for outsiders or even foreign enterprises 
to gain a foothold in the other market by acquiring another company there. As expected, FDI 
between Japan and Germany were thus not a major locus for the M&A boom of the late 
1990s; Japanese and German enterprises, to the extent that they did engage in that boom, 
rather chose engagements elsewhere. The often proclaimed similarity of the German and 
Japanese governance systems (Dore 2000, for example) thus had the paradoxical effect that 
both countries sought M&A chances elsewhere – a number of notable exceptions 
notwithstanding.   
 
 
8. Conclusions  
 
Bilateral economic relations between Japan and Germany have been the focus of this paper. 
Several quantitative indicators were calculated and basically support the view that trade as 
well as foreign direct investment links between both countries are rather weak. Nevertheless, 
a number of encouraging facts do emerge: for instance, while trade intensity between 
Germany and Japan is low in both directions, it has not declined in recent years. Germany´s 
trade intensity with the US is lower than with Japan, and Japan´s trade intensity is declining 
vis-à-vis the US, not vis-à-vis Germany. It is evident that there can be significant bilateral 
exchange when chances present themselves. For instance, when Japan´s companies prepared   26
for the European Common Market, more than 20 percent of German FDI inflow in 1990-92 
originated from Japan. Also, competitive industries or companies have made significant 
inroads into each other´s market; consumer goods, for instance, may not be one of Germany´s 
major industries, but a peculiar weakness vis-à-vis Japan cannot readily be supported by the 
evidence presented. Still, the rather low levels of economic interchange show that new 
challenges for active enterprises are rather sought elsewhere in the world. It depends on the 
two economies overcoming their current weaknesses and regaining their dynamism, whether 
bilateral economic relations will (again) become more dynamic as well. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that this paper could only tackle a few approaches of empirical 
research to gain a better understanding of German-Japanese bilateral economic relations. 
Given the importance of this relationship and the lack of studies undertaken so far, more work 
should be encouraged. For instance, using more detailed industrial demarcations should prove 
meaningful. Also, it should be studied to what extent bilateral (trade) links reflect the resource 
endowments of both economies and how they react to exchange rate fluctuation. However, 
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